BEYOND STICKS & STONES: A FIRST AMENDMENT
FRAMEWORK FOR EDUCATORS WHO SEEK TO PUNISH
STUDENT TIRFATS

INTRODUCTION

In March 1998, two middle school students planned and carried
out a deadly assault at their school in Jonesboro, Arkansas, that left
four pupils and one teacher dead.' Approximately one year later, in
April 1999, two high school students walked into Columbine High
School in Littleton, Colorado, armed with an arsenal of guns and
pipe bombs they killed twelve of their classmates and one teacher.2
These are just two of the school massacres in recent years that have
riveted the attention of the nation,3 leaving terrified parents

I See Kenneth Heard, Killer's Essay Haunts Westside Teacher, ARK.

DEMOCRAT-

GAZETrE, June 6, 1999, at Al. On the morning of March 24, 1998, thirteen-year-old
Mitchell Johnson and eleven-year-old Andrew Golden broke into the home of
Golden's grandfather, stole rifles and handguns, and drove a van that belonged to
Johnson's mother to the woods behind their middle school. See id. Johnson hid fifty
yards from the school while Golden went into the school, pulled the fire alarm, and
doubled back to meet his partner. See id. As students and teachers left the school
because of the fire alarm, Golden andJohnson opened fire, killing four students and
teacher Shannon Wright. See id. Authorities believe Johnson hoped to kill a teacher
who had disciplined him in the past. See id.
2 See Ann Beeson Holds News Conference with Others on the Law and the Columbine
High School Shooting, in FDCH Political Transcripts, Aug. 13, 1999 [hereinafter News
Conference] (statement of Troy Eid, chief counsel to Colorado governor Bill Owens).
Eighteen-year-old Eric Harris and seventeen-year-old Dylan Klebold, seniors at
Columbine High School, were associated with a group known as the "Trench Coat
Mafia" and were known admirers of Adolf Hitler and the white supremacy
movement. See id. On April 20, 1999, the anniversary of Hitler's birthday, Harris and
Klebold entered Columbine High School with guns, knives, and pipe bombs, and
used these weapons to systematically kill students pursuant to a plan that they had
spent a year developing. See id. Harris and Klebold murdered twelve students and
one teacher, wounded twenty-three other students, and ultimately killed themselves.
See id.; see also Valerie Schremp, Collinsville Schools Will Close Today Amid Bomb Rumors,
E-Mail Threats, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, Apr. 30, 1999, at Al (detailing the
murderous rampage of Harris and Klebold at Columbine High School).
3 SeeJames Brooke, 25 Feared Dead, 20 Hurt in High School
Shooting, THE COURIERJ. (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 21, 1999, at 1A. Besides the Jonesboro and Columbine High
School killings, several other recent incidents of school violence have occurred. On
May 21, 1998, a fifteen-year-old Oregon boy opened fire at his high school, killing
two peers and hurting twenty other students. See id. On May 19, 1998, an eighteen-
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searching for answers and educators asking what can be done to
prevent bloodshed at their own schools.'
School administrators across the country have begun to
implement zero-tolerance policies when dealing with threatening
behavior by students. Administrators are suspending, expelling, and
even having students arrested for discussing and planning acts of
violence against their teachers and schools. s As a result, courts have
year-old Tennessee student opened fire in his high school parking lot, killing a
classmate. See id On April 24, 1998, a fourteen-year-old Pennsylvania student killed
a science teacher in front of other students during an eighth grade graduation
dance. See id.On December 1, 1997, fourteen-year-old Michael Carneal killed three
Kentucky students and wounded five others when he opened fire in the hallway of
his high school. See id.Finally, a sixteen-year-old Mississippi boy allegedly shot nine
students at his high school, killing two, having allegedly killed his mother earlier that
day. 4 See id.
See Debbi Wilgoren, Area Schools Enhancing Security; Shootings in U.S. Prompt New
Policies,WASH. PosT, Aug. 25, 1999, at Al. According to Pam Riley, the director of
the Center for Prevention of School Violence in Raleigh, North Carolina, the center
has received over 5,000 requests from school administrators seeking guidance and
advice about how to make their schools safer following the Columbine High School
shooting. See id. Riley stated that "[t]he public expects when they drop their
children off in the morning that they will be safe." Id.;
see also Kate Folmar & Phil
Willon, Wave of Rumors, Threats Sweeps Schools, LA. TIMEs, May 1, 1999, at Al (quoting
John A. Lammel, National Association of Secondary School Principals, as saying,
"This is a terrible time for school administrators, teachers and especially students and
parents . . . every phone call, fight and bomb threat [gets] even more serious
attention than usual"); Dan Freedman, Schools Becoming Safer, Education Secretary Says;
Fewer Students Caught with Guns, Study Shows, SEATrLE POST-INTELUIGENCER, Aug. 11,
1999, at A3 (observing that "surveys have shown a level of anxiety among parents and
students over school violence").
5 See Kenneth J. Cooper & Dale Russakoff, Schools Walk Fine Line Between
Security,
Overreaction, THE LAs VEGAS REV. J., May 28, 1999, at 14A. Especially after the
Columbine shooting, "school administrators and police across the country have faced
increased pressure to crack down on student misconduct in an effort to increase
school safety." Id In several incidents, school officials have reacted strongly to
perceived threatening behavior by students. See id. For example, a nine-year-old
Maryland boy was suspended for waving a picture of a gun in his classroom. See id.
Four fifth-graders who were heard discussing the possibility of bringing guns to their
school were brought to the police station, strip-searched, charged with terroristic
threatening, and three of the four were expelled from school. See id A Virginia
student was arrested for writing an essay that involved a nuclear bomb as the school
found that the writing violated the school system's "zero-tolerance" policy. See id.
Other illustrative incidents of the "no-nonsense" approach adopted by schools and
the police include:
Two Pittsburgh seventh graders were suspended last April for
distributing a "hit list" of 10 teachers the students wanted killed.
In Miami last February, nine high school students were jailed for
distributing an underground newspaper in which one writer
speculated: "I have often wondered what would happen if I shot
Dawson [the school principal] in the head and other teachers who
have p--- d me off."
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seen a rise in civil litigation. Disgruntled parents, angry that a
suspension or expulsion has marred their child's school record, are
suing schools, seeking a reversal of the punishment and monetary
damages. To a lesser extent, teachers have filed civil suits against

In Macon County, Tennessee, two 13-year-olds were suspended in
April after a teacher found a note titled "Death List" naming 15
students .... In three separate instances occurring the same week,

officials in Fairfax County, Virginia last June suspended students for
posting a "personal death list" of 17 names on a Web site, writing a
note naming seven students the writer wanted to die, and threatening
to put a bomb in a teacher's cabinet.
Michael D. Simpson, Taking Threats Seriously, NEA TODAY, Vol. 17, No. 1, Sept. 1,
1998 (alteration in original). Two Los Angeles Times writers also describe the
precautions taken by school administrators and law enforcement personnel following
the Columbine High School shooting:
At Quartz Hill High School in the Antelope Valley, where three
students were arrested earlier in the week on suspicion of making
violent threats, administrators and teachers warned pupils that joking
about violence could lead to expulsion.
A 17-year-old student in the Bay Area suburb of San Rafael was
arrested on suspicion of posting names of students he wanted to kill on
an Internet Web page.
[P]olice in Oxnard arrested a high school student who allegedly had
threatened to blow up Hueneme High School. Officers said they
found as many as 10 pipe bombs in his house.
Folmar & Willon, supra note 4; see also News Conference (statement of Ann Beeson,
attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), supra note 2 ("[T]he
reaction, since Littleton, on the part of some school administrators has been
extreme."). In addition to strict disciplinary responses, schools across the United
States have taken a number of other safety measures, including "setting up
anonymous telephone hot lines to report trouble, buying new alarms, cameras and
metal detectors by the truckload and creating conflict mediation programs to
identify potentially dangerous students." Wilgoren, supra note 4. According to an
Education Department Report, despite the increased attention of school officials and
law enforcement personnel, the number of students that were expelled during the
1997-1998 school year for carrying firearms into school actually dropped by 31% as
compared to the number of students expelled in the prior year. See Freedman, supra
note 4.
6 See Eve Mitchell & Marianne Costantinou, Coin' Postal
Essay Gets Student
Suspended, S.F. EXAMINER, May 6, 1998, at Al (observing that, following their son's
suspension for the content of a school essay, "the youth's parents [sued] Cabrillo
Unified School District, hoping to have the suspension expunged from his
permanent school record"); Editorial, Censoring Web Pages: Tough Calls for Teachers
Trashed on the Internet, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 1, 1998, at B6 ("[A student] and his
parents sued the school district over the suspension, claiming violation of his free
speech rights and seeking $550,000 in damages."); see also Cooper & Russakoff, supra
note 5 ("[A]ccording to civil liberties lawyers, [there] has been a rash of complaints
from upset parents whose children have been suspended, expelled or arrested for
misconduct involving vaguely threatening speech, Web sites or clothing.").
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students who terrorize them.'
In response to these zero-tolerance policies, civil rights and First
Amendment groups have zealously advocated the free speech rights
of censored students!
For example, days after the Columbine
shooting, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) defended
eleven Ohio high school students who faced expulsion after they
created a web site congratulating the two Columbine gunmen for
killing their classmates. 9 Admonishing schools for dealing with pupils
as if each were a potential killer,"0 the ACLU argues that schools'
extreme disciplinary measures are the result of unfounded mass
hysteria" and constitute egregious violations of students' free speech
rights. 2 The ACLU maintains that if authority figures do not respect
7 See John M. Flora, Three Carmel Teachers Sue Student, Mom over
Web Site, THE
INDiANAPOUs NEWS, Aug. 6, 1999, at B1. High school junior Brian Conradt created a

web site that allegedly asked site visitors to ridicule his teachers. See id. The web site
intimidated and frightened the named teachers. See id. Although the student was
disciplined and the web site was taken off the Internet, the teachers sued the student,
charging him "with defamation, [intentional] infliction of emotional distress and
making false statements that caused outrage or caused mental suffering, shame and
humiliation." Id.; see also News Conference (statement of Ann Beeson, attorney with the
ACLU), supra note 2 (stating that Indiana teachers filed suit against a boy and his
mother for defamation and emotional distress after the boy created a web site that
claimed that the teachers were devil worshippers).
8 See Cooper & Russakoff, supra note 5 ("Free speech
advocates say students who
might have been unfairly disciplined have lost constitutionally protected rights as
well as learning time....").
See Editorial, Trenchcoat Rights: The ACLU Defense; Taking Liberties with School
Safety, CIN. ENQUIRER, May 12, 1999, at A18 [hereinafter CincinnatiEnquirerEditorial].
The "Trench Coat Mafia"-style web site, titled "The Field Dominion of Freaks,"
congratulated the Columbine killers and discussed the students' hatred of various
student groups, including athletes and prep students. See id. The students' ACLU
attorney claimed that the web site was meant to be a satire on the tragedy. See id.
to See id. The ACLU's Ohio executive director declared that "because you're
a
teen-ager and say something vaguely threatening, you're put in shackles .... What
happened in Colorado was tragic. But it would be doubly tragic if those who took so
many lives in Littleton were allowed to rob children across America of their right to
free expression as well." Id.
1 See News Conference (statement of Ann Beeson, attorney with the ACLU),
supra
note 2 (presenting Beeson's argument that parents' and educators' fears about
school violence are largely unfounded because less than one percent of all homicides
among minors occur in or around schools).
12 See id Some of the "extreme measures" that allegedly violate
students' rights,
as described by ACLU attorney Beeson, include a fourteen-year-old Pennsylvania girl
who was strip-searched and suspended after she told her class that she could
understand how a child could snap after being ridiculed by fellow students. See id. A
twelve-year-old Louisiana boy was placed in juvenile detention for 14 days after he
told fellow fifth graders in the lunch line that he would "get them" if they did not
leave him potatoes. See id. A student, dressed in black, was intensely questioned by
school administrators for having a chemistry book because the administrators were
concerned that the book described how to construct a bomb. See id. A nine-year-old
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the free speech rights of young people, then those young people will
grow into disillusioned adults who do not tolerate thoughts and
opinions different from their own.'3 Although school administrators
have a duty to ensure that students are educated in a safe
environment, 4 this safety may come at the cost of limited student
speech rights.
School administrators respond to arguments like those of the
ACLU by declaring that in today's violent society, it is not possible to
be too cautious. Accordingly, educators are quick to heed warning
signs of potentially violent student behavior by swiftly punishing
students who terrorize their teachers and fellow pupils.15 A Cincinnati
Enquirer Editorial concisely summarizes the position of cautious
educators and frightened parents by asking, "How many ...

victims

would gladly trade unlimited 'free expression' for a chance to draw
6
one more breath, to walk in the sun again, to hug their parents?'

According to the National Education Association's (NEA) Office
of General Counsel, educators are justified in treating student threats
seriously because many recent student killers told fellow pupils of
either their plans or their desire to kill prior to their murderous
Ohio boy was suspended after he wrote "You will die an honorable death" on a
fortune-cookie insert as part of an Asian culture class project. Id.
is See Nadine Strossen, Students' Rights and How They Are Wronged, 32 U. RICH. L.
REv. 457, 458 (1998) (the author, president of the ACLU, explaining that "[w]e
believe that if other people do not respect the rights of young people, then young
people are less likely to grow up respecting the rights of other people"); see also West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("That [schools] are
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes."); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d 1175, 1182
(E.D. Mo. 1998) ("The public interest is... served... by giving... students...
th[e] opportunity to see the protections of the United States Constitution and the
Bill of Rights at work.").
14 See News Conference (statement of James Rapp, the editor in chief of Education
Law), supra note 2. Rapp stated that, in the school context, "[d]iscipline, self
restraint and the common good may well require that we . . . subordinate some of
our individual expression and belief." Id.; see also supra notes 8-13 and accompanying
text (describing the ACLU's arguments that school safety measures are sacrificing
students' constitutional rights).
15 See Cooper & Russakoff, supra note 5 (quoting
Gary Marx, spokesman for the
American Association of School Administrators, as saying, "Schools are less likely to
take chances at this point, and I think their communities in large part would prefer
they not take chances.

.

."); Simpson, supra note 5 (quoting school superintendent

R. Mark Harris as saying, "It's real scary when you see indications that kids may be
contemplating doing things like this .... [The threats] can't be left unaddressed");
see also supra notes 5-6, 12 and accompanying text (discussing the swift punishment
imposed on students).
CincinnatiEnquirerEditorial,supra note 9.
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For example, one of the Jonesboro killers, a thirteenrampages.
year-old student, told fellow pupils prior to his crime that he "had
some killing to do."'8 Columbine killer Dylan Klebold wrote various
violent essays that so disturbed his teacher that she felt the need to
discuss them with his parents.' 9 Eric Harris, the other Columbine
gunman, posted death threats against fellow students on his web
site.l
As the debate rages on between staunch free speech supporters
and cautious school administrators, the United States Supreme Court
remains relatively silent as to the extent of students' First
Amendment rights, especially in the context of low-value speech such
as vulgarity, incitement, and threats. Ultimately, educators are faced
with a dangerous dilemma. The educators can take a threat seriously,
possibly infringing students' First Amendment rights, and then
become confronted with a lawsuit brought by indignant parents.
Alternatively, educators can wait to see if the vociferous, threatening
student eventually comes to school carrying a handgun, intent on
fulfilling his murderous threats.'
This Comment addresses student threats against teachers,
schools, or fellow students, and the First Amendment issues that may
arise as educators struggle to deal with these threats. The Comment
discusses threats, in the form of pure speech, by elementary and high
See Simpson, supra note 5 ("[S]chool officials have good reason to treat these
kinds of [student] threats seriously. Most of the alleged killers in the campus
shootings this past year actually told others about their plans to kill before they took
violent action . . . ."). According to June Arnette, the Associate Director of the
National Safe Schools Center in Westlake Village, California, students know which of
their peers are capable of violence and which students have uttered threats. See
Students Hold Key to Ending Violence; Lesson Learnedfrom School Shootings: Listen to Your
Students, SCH. VIOLENcE ALERT, Vol. 5. No. 5, May 1999 [hereinafter Students Hold
Key]. Jonesboro Middle School teacher Beth Fuller has also declared that teachers
must pay close attention to warning signs from problematic students in order to avert
school violence. See Heard, supra note 1. Before the Jonesboro shooting, a student
had warned Fuller that MitchellJohnson was after her. See id.
18 Simpson, supra note 5. According to Jonesboro teacher Beth Fuller, Mitchell
Johnson was known for his explosive temper and wrote an essay 14 months before
the shootings about hating his suspension and that he planned to shoot "squirrels,"
which was believed to be a code word for teachers and students. See Heard, supra
note 1.
19 See CincinnatiEnquirerEditorial, supra note
9.
20 See News Conference (statement of Troy Eid, chief counsel to Colorado
governor
Bill Owens), supra note 2.
2
See Tim Swarens, Editorial, Seeking Security at Schoo4 IND. STAR, Aug. 27, 1999, at
A18 ("Pretend you're a teacher. How do you distinguish between idle words and
legitimate threat? Lean one way and you might be chased one day by a kid with a
gun. Lean the other and you might find a lawyer with a subpoena coming after
you.").
17
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school students, but will not delve into the constitutional speech
rights of post-secondary students. The reasons for this narrowed focus
are numerous, but the primary ones include (1) the majority of postsecondary students are no longer juveniles, hence, the utilization of
law enforcement and criminal punishment becomes a viable option
in lieu of school discipline; (2) few federal court cases discuss the
applicability of the First Amendment to grammar school students,
leaving schools to search blindly for answers; (3) civic education the teaching of courtesy and respect - is an important goal in
secondary and lower schools, while college students are assumed
already to have learned these essential civic lessons;2 and (4) smaller
classes, greater daily interaction with teachers and peers, and lower
maturity levels cultivate situations in which elementary and high
school students seem more inclined to vocalize and act upon their
feelings of violence and bitterness. 5 Moreover, courts generally are
more protective of students' free speech rights as the age and grade
level of the students increase. Therefore, courts intensely scrutinize
restrictions that are placed on post-secondary student speech.24
The analysis of this Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I
reviews the "true threat" doctrine and describes the tests that courts
have established for evaluating whether verbal terrorism should be
protected speech or speech subject to punishment. Part II considers
general education jurisprudence in the context of the First
Amendment. Part III discusses recent federal and state cases that
involve students' violent expressions. Finally, Part IV argues that
student threats need not rise to the level of a "true threat" to be
legally punished. Part IV also contains a constitutional framework
that school administrators can utilize when they are faced with the
See Garner K. Weng, Type No Evil: The Proper Latitude of Public Educational
Institutions in RestrictingExpressions of Their Students on the Internet, 20 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 751, 777-78 (1998) (discussing the three basic goals of public educational
institutions that courts have recognized: civic education, democratic education, and
critical education). In contrast, educator Gary Pavela claims that colleges and
universities have a significant impact on student behavior and the learning of civility.
See Gary Pavela, Civility and Student Life, 27 STESONL. REv. 161, 164 (1997).
The number of violent incidents involving elementary and secondary school
students demonstrates this trend. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text
(discussing recent incidents of school violence involving elementary and high school
students). In addition, at least one survey indicates that American teenagers rank
violence as the biggest problem at their schools. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIM. JUST.
STAT. 1998 98 (Table 2.7).
24 See Weng, supra note 22, at 773 ("The Court has been somewhat more
vigilant
in protecting First Amendment rights of students at the college and university level..
. The Court looks at the university as a haven for intellectual discourse and debate
in need of the greatest First Amendment protections.").
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dilemma of how and when to regulate threatening student speech.
This framework focuses particularly on electronic threats by students,
as the Internet becomes the medium of choice for the younger
generation and provides an effortless means of committing verbal
terrorism.25
I. THE "TRUE THREAT" DOCTRINE

The First Amendment ensures that Congress "shall make no law
the freedom of speech." 6 The United States Supreme
Court, however, has carved out various classes of speech that are not
worthy of full, if any, constitutional protection, including threats,
defamation, speech that incites violence, fighting words, and
obscenity.2 Government may regulate and censor these types of
speech because they are "'of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.'"2
Supreme Court
precedent suggests that the First Amendment is not violated when a
citizen is convicted under a statute that criminalizes threats, as long as
the citizen's speech was a "true threat."29 The "true threat" doctrine,
and the precedent upon which it is founded, is an amalgamation of
cases that deal mainly with two unprotected classes of speech:
threatening speech and speech that incites violence.
Watts v. United Statess° is the seminal Supreme Court case that
established the "true threat" doctrine, although the Court did not
specifically define "true threat."3' Watts, however, has not provided
...abridging

See David C. Potter, TheJake Baker Case: True Threats and New Technology, 79 B.U.
L. REv. 779, 801 (1999) ("New technology, especially computers, creates new
methods for people to commit old crimes and provides new means for people to
commit harmful acts that are not currently defined as crimes.").
26 U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
27 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 382-88 (1992).
28 Id. at 382 (quoting Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
Elaborating, the Court explained that these certain types of speech could "be
regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity,
defamation, etc.) - not [because] ...they are categories of speech entirely invisible
to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content." Id. at 383-84.
29 See Potter, supra note 25, at 792 ("Using the Supreme Court's
reasoning ...a
criminal conviction under a threat statute that is based on a finding that a statement
is a true threat, does not violate the First Amendment. . . .").

A "true threat" is "a

serious threat as distinguished from words uttered as mere political argument, idle
talk orjest." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1480 (6th ed. 1990).

394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
See id. at 708. The Court described a "true threat" as something more than
"political hyperbole." See id.
20
21
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clear guidance to lower courts, as the courts have struggled during
the last thirty years to formulate a workable "true threat" test.3 2 In
Watts, the defendant was convicted, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 871 (a), 3
of knowingly threatening the President when he threatened
President Lyndon B. Johnson at an anti-war rally54 The Supreme
Court overturned the conviction, holding that Watts's "political
hyperbole" did not implicate the statute." Because the risk was too
great that valuable public discourse would be stifled, the Court
explained that before speech could be punished, the First
Amendment required the government to demonstrate that the
speech constituted a "true threat." 6 In determining whether Watts's
speech could be punished, the Court examined the context in which
the statement was uttered, the conditional quality of the utterance,
and the reaction of those within earshot of the statement, ultimately
deciding that Watts's comments did not rise to the level of a "true

32

See Potter, supra note 25, at 791 ("Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not

articulated a rationale that lower courts can easily apply in examining other threat
cases under the First Amendment.").
33 18 U.S.C. § 871(a)
provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or
for a delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter,
paper, writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to
take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the
United States, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer
next in the order of succession to the office of President of the United
States, or the Vice President-elect, or knowingly and willfully otherwise
makes any such threat against the President, President-elect, Vice
President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office
of President, or Vice President-elect, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1994).
The Court emphasized that in examining this type of statute, in which a class of
"pure speech" is criminalized, the statute "must be interpreted with the commands of
the First Amendment clearly in mind. Wat is a threat must be distinguishedfrom what is
constitutionallyprotected speech." Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 (emphasis added).
M See Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-06. Watts stated that "[i]f they ever make me
carry a
rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.BJ." Id.
See id. at 708. The Court found that the defendant's only offense was his crude
and offensive method of expressing his political opposition to the President. See id.
36 See id.
In discussing the value of public discourse, the Court noted that
occasionally such debate could become offensive and insulting. See id. Accordingly,
the Court explained that the language of § 871(a) had to be interpreted "'against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials.'" Id.(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
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threat."07 Watts implies that a statement "which an objective, rational
observer would tend to interpret, in its factual context, as a credible
threat, is a 'true threat' which may be punished by the government. "m
In searching for a workable "true threat" standard, lower courts
have also used language and reasoning from the Supreme Court case
of Brandenburgv. Ohio,39 which discussed speech that may be punished
if it could incite others to commit violent acts.4 In Brandenburg, the
Court struck down Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act and held that the
government cannot prosecute an individual merely because that
individual teaches or advocates the use of force for political or social
reform.4 ' The Court distinguished speech that is mere advocacy from
speech that is an incitement to imminent lawless action, with the
former meriting constitutional protection only until the point at
which such advocacy is likely to result in such action. 2
Although not a "true threat" case, the Court's more recent
decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Pau s contributed to the development
of the "true threat" doctrine. In striking down a Minnesota hatecrime ordinance as facially unconstitutional, the Court emphasized
that content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively
The Court clarified that threatening speech
unconstitutional."
generally is not protected by the First Amendment; not necessarily
See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
s8 Potter, supra note 25, at 793 (quoting United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492,
1505 (6th Cir. 1997) (Krupansky,J., dissenting)).
s9 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir.
1976)
(articulating a "true threat" test with language reminiscent of the Brandenburg
standard).
41 See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447, 448. The defendant, the leader of
a Ku Klux
Klan group, was arrested after making racist and inflammatory statements during a
rally. See id.at 444-45. The Court explained that the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act
made it illegal to advocate the necessity of violence as a means of achieving industrial
or political reform. See id. The Court emphasized that the Act intended "to punish
mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others
merely to advocate the described type of action." Id. at 449. Accordingly, the Court
ruled that "[s]uch a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
37

42

43

See id. at 447, 449.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).

See id. at 391, 382. Admonishing the government, the Court made it clear that
"hostility - or favoritism - towards the underlying message expressed" is not a valid
basis upon which legislators may regulate speech. Id. at 386. Although the Court
accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation that the ordinance applied
only to "fighting words," the Court ruled that "the ordinance is facially
unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of
the subjects the speech addresses." Id. at 381.
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because the government disagrees with the speaker's underlying
message, but because the very nature of the speech is so harmful that
the government has a duty to protect its citizens from the alarm and
disruption the speech produces and from the likelihood that the
threatened harm will occur.45
Lower federal courts have grappled with the application of the
"true threat" doctrine and, in particular, its role in allowing the
government to criminally punish threatening speech pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 875(c).4
The United States circuit courts of appeals
currently disagree as to whether the mens rea requirement of §
875 (c) calls for the speaker to possess a specific intent to threaten
another, or whether a general intent requirement will suffice. 7 The
majority of circuits stress that the statutory language contains no
specific intent component and conclude that the government may
punish the speech at issue if a reasonable person would consider the
statements to be threats, regardless of the defendant's actual intent to
cause fear.
Moreover, courts are generally reluctant to criminally
punish4 9 pure speech without evidence of the seriousness of the
threat.

The Second Circuit created the Kelner test to address the intent
standard of § 875(c) in light of the reasoning of Watts.50 In United
45 See id.
at 380, 388.

See Potter, supra note 25, at 782-90. Title 18, § 875(c) of the United States
Code provides that "[wihoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure
the person of another, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994).
47 See Potter, supra note 25, at 785-88 (describing the diverse holdings of
the
courts of appeals as to the mens rea requirement of § 875(c)).
See id. at 788-90. The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that requires specific
intent under § 875(c), while six other circuits have held that § 875(c) requires
general intent. See id. at 788-89.
49 See Sally Greenberg, Threats, Harassment, and Hate On-Line: Recent Developments,
6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 673, 680 (1997) (referring to the holding in United States v.
Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Alkhabaz,
104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997), as an example of courts' reluctance "to punish all but
the most egregious of threats under this 'true threat' standard"). In Baker, a
University of Michigan student was charged with transmitting threats in interstate
commerce in violation of § 875(c) after he posted a sadistic rape and torture story
about a fellow classmate on a public newsgroup and exchanged e-mail with another
young man regarding abducting and raping young girls. See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at
1378-80. The court dismissed the charges, stating that a discussion of fantasies did
not implicate the statute because the communications expressed only a general
desire to hurt women and lacked a specific target and specific expression of intent.
See id. at 1385-91.
50 See Robert Kurman Kelner, United States v. Jake Baker: Revisiting Threats and
the FirstAmendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 287, 294 (1998).
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States v. Kelner,5' the defendant, a leader of the Jewish Defense
League, was convicted of violating § 875(c) after he told television
reporters that his group was planning to assassinate Yasser Arafat."'
In sustaining the conviction and the constitutionality of the statute,
the Second Circuit held that pure speech can be punished if "the
threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person
threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect
of execution."" The language of this test is consistent with the
language in Watts and also evokes the Brandenburg incitement
standard. 5 Acknowledging the general- versus specific-intent debate
regarding § 875(c), Kelner clarified that the statute punishes the
expression itself, not the intent to perform the threatening act.5 The
Kelner test has been described as a stringent "true threat" analysis that
is calculated to exclude situations in which the defendant did not
intend to inflict injury.57
The case of greatest relevance to the analysis of "true threats"
made by students is Lovell v. Poway Unified School District." In Lovell,
51
52

534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).

See id. at 1021.

Id. at 1027. Applying the test to Kelner's speech, the court noted that his
statement "'We are planning to assassinate Mr. Arafat'" was unequivocal and
unconditional. 1d. at 1028. The court also found that Kelner's statement "'We have
people who have been trained and who are out now...'" was immediate. Id. Finally,
the court announced that Kelner's targeting of Arafat and his lieutenants was
specific. See id. Accordingly, the court concluded that Kelner's utterances were "true
threats" punishable under the statute. See id.
See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. The Watts Court clarified that speech must be taken
in context and "the expressly conditional nature of [a] statement" will weigh against
finding it a "true threat." Id.
55 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
The Brandenburg Court
stressed that a state can punish advocacy when such advocacy "is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
Id.
See Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1023. The court stated that "[i] t was not necessary under
the statute for the Government to prove that appellant had a specific intent or a
present ability to carry out his threat .... but only that he intended to communicate
a threat of injury through means reasonably adapted to that purpose." Id. (citations
omitted).
57 See Kelner, supra note 50, at 296-97 ("[T]he Second Circuit in
Kelner concluded
that the First Amendment concerns surrounding general threat statutes could be
adequately addressed through a stringent 'true threat' test designed to weed out
cases in which the accused speaker did not intend to do real harm.").
90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996). This case is addressed in Part I and not Part III
because the court did not consider the school context relevant to the holding.
Rather, the court viewed the threats as "true threats" in any forum, explaining that "it
does not matter to our analysis that Sarah Lovell uttered her comments while at
school . . . because we hold that threats such as Lovell's are not entitled to First
53
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high school student Sarah Lovell was suspended after she allegedly
threatened a school guidance counselor. Lovell filed suit against
the school district, the principal, and the assistant principal, claiming
that the school officials violated her First Amendment rights when
they suspended her for her comment. 60 The district court found that
Lovell's First Amendment rights were violated, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed,61finding that the words she uttered were unprotected "true
threats."
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit utilized an
objective "true threat" test that asked whether a reasonable individual
would anticipate that the listener would interpret the speaker's
statement as a serious declaration of the speaker's intent to commit
violence. 2 Abiding by the Supreme Court's command in Watts, the
court examined the entire factual context in which the threat was
uttered, noting all of the surrounding events and the responses of the
listeners, and found that the statement was unequivocal enough to
constitute a "true threat" of violence.'s
According to the Ninth Circuit, the lower court's erroneous
conclusion that Lovell's comments did not constitute a "true threat"
arose from the district court's failure to focus on whether a
reasonable student would anticipate that the guidance counselor
would construe her statement as serious and containing a real intent
to injure. 64 Before concluding the opinion, the court clarified that
Amendment protection in any forum." Id,at 371.
59 See id.at 368. Lovell's exact comments to her guidance
counselor were
disputed, but the statement essentially was that Lovell was going to shoot the
counselor if she did not alter Lovell's class schedule. See id.
60 See id. at 370.
61 See id.
at 368, 372.
62 See id.
at 372. According to the court, a threat is not protected by the First
Amendment if "'a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious
expression of intent to harm or assault.'" Id. (quoting United States v. OrozcoSantillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372-73. The court recognized that "any person could
reasonably consider the statement ... made by an angry teenager, to be a serious
expression of intent to harm or assault .... This statement is unequivocal and
specific enough to convey a true threat of physical violence." Id. at 372.
64 See id.According to the Ninth Circuit, the "ultimate inquiry"
for the lower
court should have been "whether a reasonable person in Lovell's position would
foresee that [the guidance counselor] would interpret her statement as a serious
expression of intent to harm or assault." Id. Although the court equated the test
established in Lovell with the Kelner "true threat" test, at least one author has noted
that the tests are not necessarily in accord. See Kelner, supra note 50, at 299-300
(according to Kelner, the Lovell court confused matters when the court cited the
Kelner "true threat" test as if this standard was in accord with the reasonable person
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although courts may consider the actual effect of the utterance on
the victim when determining whether a statement constitutes a "true
threat," ultimately the court must ascertain whether a reasonable
individual should have anticipated that his utterance would cause
alarm. 65
Although the Ninth Circuit did not emphasize Supreme Court
precedent in the area of students' speech rights, the court's analysis
did address the brutality prevalent in modem public schools and
commented that, given this violence, the guidance counselor not
surprisingly felt threatened.6 Ultimately, though, the Ninth Circuit's
comments failed to clarify the degree of latitude schools possess and
the degree of discretion they can exercise in dealing with students'
threats of violence. The language of Lovell implies, however, that had
the court relied upon "school law" precedent 67 to establish that the
school had a constitutional right to punish the student, it could have
done so with ease.68
II. FIRST AMENDMENTJURISPRUDENCE RELATED TO THE SCHOOL
CONTEXT

Public school teachers and administrators are state actors who
must abide by the Constitution, including both the First Amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 First
inquiry established in the opinion).
5 See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372-73. The court clarified that "[w]hile courts may
consider the effect on the listener when determining whether a statement constitutes
a true threat, the final result turns upon whether a reasonable person in these
circumstances should have foreseen that his or her words would have this effect." Id.
at 373.
66 See id. at 374. The court emphasized "that violence is prevalent
in public
schools today, and that teachers and administrators must take threats by students
very seriously." Id. The court cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
DistricA 393 U.S. 503 (1969), Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986), and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), however, as supporting the
proposition that the First Amendment only provides limited protection for student
communications within the school context. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 371.
67 See infra notes
69-99 and accompanying text (discussing education
jurisprudence in the context of the First Amendment).
See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 371. The court explained that "[t]o resolve the federal
claim, we need not rely upon the Supreme Court cases that limit students' free
speech rights; because we hold that threats such as Lovell's are not entitled to First
Amendment protection in any forum...." Id.
69 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-07 ("First Amendment rights . . .are available
to
teachers and students .... [T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for
affirming the comprehensive authority . . . of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools."); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) ("The authority [of] the
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Amendment jurisprudence in the context of the school setting is a
unique and continually evolving area of law.7" Supreme Court
decisions reviewing the rights of students contain the underlying
theme that the school environment is unique and fragile, such that
the need to protect it might allow an allocation of rights between
students and the state that would be unconstitutional if applied to
another group of individuals.7' At the same time, the Supreme Court
has demonstrated an understanding that students should be taught
the value of constitutional freedom by example and that students are
persons under the Constitution who possess fundamental rights that
the state must respect n With these competing considerations in
mind, the Supreme Court formed the basis for modern student
speech rights in three First Amendment cases.
For many scholars, the apex of student speech rights was the
Vietnam-era decision of Tinker v. Des Moines.73 In Tinker, a school
suspended students who failed to abide by the school's request that
they remove their black anti-war armbands.74 The Supreme Court
considered the wearing of the armbands "pure speech," which is
granted exhaustive protection under the First Amendment. 7 The
Court emphasized that students and teachers have a right to enjoy
First Amendment protection, even in the educational environment,
and held that the students have a constitutional right to wear the
armbands in school.76
State . . . in its schools . . . must be exercised consistently with constitutional
safeguards ....[T]he State is constrained to recognize a student's... entitlement to
a public education ... which may not be taken away... without adherence to the...
procedures [of the Due Process] Clause.").
70 See Thomas Fischer, The Law & Education: Supreme Court
DoctrineReaches Critical
Mass, 13 Miss. C. L. REv. 287, 288-91 (1993) (discussing the evolution of school law).
71

See id. at 288.

See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 736 ("It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools.").
73 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See Strossen, supra note 13, at 458 (claiming
that Tinker
was the "high-water mark for students' rights.").
74 See Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 735.
See id. at 736. Agreeing with the lower court's analysis of the type of speech at
issue, the Court noted "that the wearing of an armband for the purpose of
expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment" and was "closely akin to 'pure speech' which, we
have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment." Id. (citations omitted).
76 See id. at 736, 740. The Court emphasized that "[s]tudents
in school as well as
out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution" and are "possessed of
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The Court distinguished the passive act of wearing the armbands
from speech that interferes with the work of the school or intrudes
upon the rights of other students." The crux of the Court's analysis,
often referred to as the Tinker test, asked whether the forbidden
speech would substantially disrupt the work or disciplinary process of
the school, or whether the speech involved significant disorder or the
invasion of the rights of other students.78
Unlike the political speech in Tinker, Bethel School DistrictNo. 403
v. Fraser addressed student speech rights involving speech deemed
of minimal value - lewd speech.8 Specifically, the Supreme Court
questioned whether the First Amendment bars educators from
punishing a student who gives a sexually explicit and lewd speech
during an assembly.8' The high school student, Matthew Fraser,
brought suit against the school district, alleging violations of his First
Amendment rights.n
Fraser had been suspended for vulgar
comments he made during a school assembly.8
fundamental rights which the State must respect." Id. at 739. Hence, the Court held
that without evidence that the speech interfered with classwork or caused disorder,
"our Constitution does not permit officials of the State to deny [students'] form of
expression."
at 740.
n See id. atId.740.
Describing the passive nature of the student speech,
the Court
explained that the "petitioners merely went about their ordained rounds in school.
Their deviation consisted only in wearing on their sleeve a band of black cloth, not
more than two inches wide .... They neither interrupted school activities nor sought
to intrude in school affairs or the lives of others." Id. In contrast, the Court felt that
"conduct by [a] student.., which for any reason... materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." Id.
78 See id.
7 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
80 See id. at 677.
s1 See id.

See id. at 679.
See id. Fraser gave the following speech during a high school presentation in
support of a fellow student's candidacy for student government:
"'I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his
shirt, his character is firm - but most.., of all, his belief in you, the
students of Bethel, is firm.
"'Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If
necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack
things in spurts - he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally he succeeds.
"'Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax, for
each and every one of you.
"'So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president - he'll never come
between you and the best our high school can be.'"
Id. at 687 (Brennan,J., concurring) (alterations in original).
Fraser was suspended for violating a Bethel High School rule that stated that
82

83
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Examining the First Amendment in the school context, the
Court observed that the constitutional rights of students were not
equivalent to the rights of adults in other contexts." The Court
noted that, although adults may have a constitutional right to use
vulgar terms, schools may punish students for using such vulgarities.8'
In addition, the Court stated that the determination of the manner of
speech appropriate and permitted in a school rests within the
discretion of school administrators. 6 Accordingly, the Court held
that the school administrators possessed the discretion to punish
Fraser for his offensive, though not legally obscene, speech, in order
to protect the sensibilities of the children in the assembly who were
captive listeners to his comments. The Court also found that the
school had a right to punish Fraser as a means of disassociating itself
from his comments and demonstrating to the student body that lewd
conduct is entirely inconsistent with the basic values of public
education.'8
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,89 the most recent Supreme
Court case to address students' First Amendment rights, advanced
Frasers rationale that schools are entitled to disassociate themselves
from speech that is inconsistent with their educational goals. 90 In
Hazelwood, three student staff members of a school-sponsored
"[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process
is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Id. at
678.
See id at 682. The Court expounded that "[i]t does not follow.., that simply
because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults..
the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school." Id.
See id The Court announced that "[s]urely it is a highly appropriate function
of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public
discourse." Id at 683.
86 See Fraser,478 U.S. at 683 ("The determination
of what manner of speech in
the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
board.").
87 See id. at 685.
The Court cited various cases that identified "the obvious
concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to
protect children - especially in a captive audience - from exposure to sexually
explicit, indecent, or lewd speech." Id. at 684. In recognition of this concern, the
Court reasoned that "schools... may determine that the essential lessons of civil,
mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or
offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy." Id. at
683.
88 See id. at 685-86. The Court stated that "it was perfectly appropriate
for the
school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and
lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school
education." Id.
90

484 U.S. 260 (1988).
See id. at 266-67 (citing Fraser,478 U.S. at 685-86).
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newspaper sued the school district for violating their First
Amendment rights after the school prevented them from publishing
various articles on teen pregnancy. 9' The Court distinguished the
First Amendment requirement that a school tolerate some
unpleasant student expression from the issue of whether a school
must actively endorse certain student speech.92 The Court reasoned
that in the latter situation, as long as the regulation is reasonable and
based on legitimate pedagogical concerns, school officials have the
right to regulate expressive activities that may be perceived as bearing
the imprimatur of the school. 5 The Court ruled for the defendant
school district, stating that the school was entitled to exercise
extensive editorial control over school-sponsored student speech to
ensure that students under its care were not exposed to
inappropriate material. 94
Following Hazelwood, courts may rely upon three distinct
standards to analyze issues involving students' First Amendment
rights in the school context. 95 Courts may utilize the Tinker standard,
which allows administrators to punish student speech that is
materially disruptive to the school environment.' Courts may apply
See id. at 262-64.
See id. at 270-71. According to the Court, "[t]he question whether the First
Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech" is distinct "from
the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to
promote particular student speech." Id.
93 See id. The Court felt that "[a] school must be able to set high
standards for
the student speech that is disseminated under its auspices . . . and may refuse to
disseminate student speech that does not meet those standards." Id. at 271-72.
9
See id. at 266, 271-72. The Court stated that school officials are entitled to
exercise expansive control over school-sponsored student speech in order "to assure
that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers
or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of
maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed
to the school." Id. at 271.
95 See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524,
530 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that "scab" political buttons worn by students during school hours were not
inherently disruptive). The Chandler court concluded that "three distinct areas of
student speech" can be distilled from Supreme Court precedent: "(1) vulgar, lewd,
obscene, and plainly offensive speech, (2) school-sponsored speech, and (3) speech
that falls into neither of these categories." Id. at 529. The court indicated that the
first type of speech is governed by Fraser,the second by Hazelwood, and all other types
of s9eech by Tinker. See id. at 529.
See text accompanying note 78 supra (detailing the Tinker test). In Hazelwood,
the Supreme Court asserted that, although "[t]he dissent perceives no difference
between the First Amendment analysis in Tinker and that applied in Fraser," a
distinction between the analyses exists. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 n.4. The Court
explained that the decision in Fraserrested on the lewd and offensive character of a
speech given during an official school event rather than on any tendency of the
91
92
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the Hazelwood standard when the school sponsors or fosters student
expression in some manner.97 This standard allows the school to
control the content and dissemination of the speech as long as the
regulation is reasonably related to educational concerns. 98 Finally,
Fraser has been interpreted to stand for the principle that some
student speech is not worthy of constitutional protection, regardless
of whether that speech is sponsored by the school, because the very
nature of the speech is inconsistent with the educational mission of
schools. 9
III. FEDERAL AND STATE CASES: STUDENT THREATS OF VIOLENCE

The Supreme Court has yet to establish the extent of a student's
First Amendment rights in the context of threatening speech. With
no Supreme Court guidance, lower courts disagree about the degree
of discretion school administrators can exercise when deciding
whether to punish a student's threatening speech. Three recurring
inquiries arise in the courts' analyses. First, did the student's threat
occur during school hours or within the school environment?
Second, within what context or circumstances was the student threat
uttered? Third, what was the reaction of the person to whom the
threat was directed, and if that reaction was fear, was that fear a
reasonable and foreseeable reaction? All of the cases discussed below
involve the issue of violent, threatening student speech. Yet only one
of the cases can clearly be labeled a "student threat" case. One
reason for this difficulty in locating case law that solely addresses
student threats is that the student expression at issue is frequently a
potpourri of low-value speech.'0° Typically, obscene language is
written to threaten teachers and, frequently, to incite fellow students
to violent action. '°' Another reason is that courts are eager to locate
speech to disrupt classwork or invade the rights of others. See id.
97 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73; see also supra notes 89-94 and accompanying
text (analyzing Hazelwood).
98 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
99 See Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529, 530. The Chandler court stated that
"the
deferential Fraserstandard applies when ... speech... is vulgar, lewd, obscene, or
plainly offensive without a showing that such speech occurred during a schoolsponsored event or threatened to 'substantially interfere with [the school's] work.'"
Id. at 529 (citations omitted); see also Heller v. Hodgin, 928 F. Supp. 789, 798 (S.D.
Ind. 1996) (stating that the offensive and vulgar nature of student speech can be
enough, in and of itself, to justify the school's discipline of a student).
See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing low-value speech such
as obscenity, fighting words, and vulgarity).
101 See, e.g., Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987)
(involving a vulgar student publication that encouraged fellow students to take
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the obscenity or vulgarity within the student speech, rather than to
focus on the threats themselves - an approach that enables the
courts to utilize the analysis and reasoning in Fraser.
The first case examined, Bystrom v. Fridley High School,'° involved
three high school students who were suspended after they distributed
an "underground" student newspaper that included an article
entitled "Trash and Slash" that applauded the vandalism of a
teacher's home.0 5 The students sued the school pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983,' 4 alleging that the school violated their First
Amendment rights.'05 The court granted the school district's motion
for summary judgment and dismissed the action.'"
The court reasoned that the school had three legitimate bases
for punishing the students.' °7 First, the court explained that the
underground newspaper, although pure speech, caused a substantial
disruption of educational activities. 8 Although the students did not
intend to disrupt school activities, the court observed that the
dissemination of the newspapers was the root cause of the ensuing
chaos in the school's classrooms and, therefore, was a punishable
act. '°9 Second, the court noted that the newspaper contained
language that was sexually explicit and inconsistent with the values of
public education; therefore, the school administrators could

violent action).
102 686 F. Supp. 1387
(D. Minn. 1987).
'o See id. at 1389-90.
104 Title 42, § 1983 of the United
States Code provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
105 See Bystrov, 686 F. Supp. at 1390.
,06 See id. at 1396.
107

See id. at 1392-93.

108 See id. at 1392.

The court initially noted that the case "involves only pure
speech" and that there was "no claim that the plaintiff students' conduct in distributing
the... papers... disrupted regular school activities." Id. (emphasis added).
See id. The court found that, although the plaintiffs did not intend to disrupt
school activities, the fact remained that "[iln circulating, reading, and reacting to
this publication, some students at the school disrupted their classes to such a degree
that their teachers found it necessary to interrupt their teaching to quell these
disruptions." Id. at 1390. Accordingly, the court reasoned that it was constitutionally
permissible for school officials to "punish that disruption." See id. at 1392.

2000]

STUDENT THREATS

655

discipline the students.'
Finally, the court stated that the newspaper advocated violent
The court compared the
action toward school employees."'
newspaper to the speech in Fraser, in which the speech was
punishable in the school environment although the sexually vulgar
language at issue could not have been regulated according to the
indecent speech standards applied to adults."' Analogizing, the court
reasoned that although the language of "Trash and Slash" fell short
of the standards by which adults could be penalized for advocating
rhetoric could
violence pursuant to the Brandenburgtest,"' the violent
4
be regulated because the speaker was a student.1
At the opposite end of the spectrum of constitutional protection
for student speech is Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District,"' in
which a district court admonished high school officials for trampling
upon a student's First Amendment rights." 6 High school student
Brandon Beussink used his personal computer to create a homepage
that used vulgar language to criticize a Woodland teacher and the
school principal, Yancy Poorman. "1 Poorman suspended Beussink
for ten days, which resulted in Beussink failing all his classes due to
the school's absenteeism policy."" Beussink requested a preliminary
n1 See id. at 1393; see also supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text (examining
Fraser).
I See Bystrom, 686 F. Supp. at 1393. The court was referring to an article in the
unofficial student newspaper that discussed an incident of vandalism at a teacher's
home and commented that "'many students attending Fridley would like to claim
responsibility for this act, and I can't say that I blame them.'" Id. at 1390.
See id.
n1 See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra (defining the Brandenburgtest).
14 See Bystrom, 686 F. Supp. at 1393. The court ruled that the student
article could
be censored, even though the "constitutional guarantees of free speech ... do not
permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force . .. except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action" and that "[n]o such . . . likelihood
appear(ed] in the plaintiff students' publication." Id. The court concluded by
speculating that "the Supreme Court would defer to the school authorities ... with
respect to their decision to discipline the plaintiff students for advocating violence
agai.nst their teachers." Id.
30 F. Supp.2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
116 See id. at 1182.
The court enjoined the school district from sanctioning
Beussink in any way for his speech and advised Woodland school officials that "it is
provocative and challenging speech, like Beussink's, which is most in need of the
protections of the First Amendment." Id.
117 See id. at 1177-78. Beussink's web page, using vulgar language, criticized the
school's web site and encouraged visitors to contact the principal and inform him of
their dislike for the site. See Suspension over Web Page Violates Student's Free Speech
(visitedJan. 20, 2000) <http://www.hannibal.net/stories/123198/webpage.html>.
M8Seeid. at 1180.
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injunction to enjoin the school from considering his suspension
when calculating his grades, claiming that the suspension violated his
First Amendment rights. 9 The court concluded that the principal's
actions in suspending Beussink were not justified because they were
based on Poorman's personal distaste of the homepage and not on
any legitimate fear of disruption to the school environment.
The court stated that Buessink's homepage, characterized as
containing "provocative and challenging" speech, could actually be
valuable for stimulating public discourse. 2 ' The court reasoned that
Buessink's speech should be protected, even if it is unpopular, as
long as it does not substantially interfere with the mission of the
school.'2 The district court granted the injunction, finding it likely
that Beussink could prove that his First Amendment rights were
violated.'23
Klein v. Smith, 24 though not a true "student threat" case,
illustrates the concern that some courts have about whether
administrators are reaching too far outside of the educational
environment to regulate student speech. 25 Klein involved student
vulgarity directed toward a teacher, but reached a different
conclusion than the Supreme Court did in Fraser29
Klein was
suspended for ten days for making a vulgar gesture to a teacher,
although the gesture was made neither on school grounds nor during
school hours. 27 Klein filed suit, asking for a permanent injunction
19
12

See id. at 1177, 1182.
See id. at 1180. The court stressed that "[d]isliking or being upset by the

content of a student's speech is not an acceptable justification" for punishing that
speech. I&
121 See Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d at 1182. The court emphasized that
"[o]ne of the
core functions of free speech is to invite dispute. 'It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger."' Id. at 1181-82 (quoting Terminiello v.
City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
2
See id. at 1182. The court stated that the very purpose of the First Amendment
is to protect unpopular speech and that the public interest is best served not by
censoring Beussink, but "by giving the students at Woodland High School this
opportunity to see the protections of the United States Constitution and the Bill of
Rights at work." Id.
12 See id.
t24 635 F. Supp. 1440 (D.
Me. 1986).
1
See id. at 1442. While acknowledging that "[u]nder ideal circumstances, the
effective response to out-of-school misbehavior would be the swift application of...
parental discipline," the court declared that teachers may not trespass upon First
Amendment rights in their eagerness to provide such discipline. Id.
12
See id. at 1440, 1442.
2
See id. at 1440-41. Klein extended the middle finger of his hand toward his
teacher in a restaurant parking lot. See id. The court noted that "[d]efendant's
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against the suspension.s 8 The court granted the injunction, finding
that the suspension violated the First Amendment.'2
The court explained that Klein's lewd speech occurred far from
school premises, outside of school hours, and with no relation to any
school activity. '" Therefore, the court reasoned, any connection
between the vulgar gesture to a member of the teaching staff and the
orderly functioning of the school's activities was too attenuated to
sustain a disciplinary action against Klein for violating the school rule
prohibiting discourteous behavior toward a teacher.'
School administrators had argued that the effect of Klein's
gesture diminished teachers' resolve to discipline students properly,
thereby adversely affecting the teacher-pupil relationship and the
Citing Tinker, the school
efficient operation of the school.'32
administrators reasoned that the adverse educational consequences
should have negated any expressive value the speech may have had.3
The court disagreed, explaining that individual liberty of expression
outweighed the need to discipline Klein for his rude gesture.-" The
court also dismissed the school's contention that the gesture should
be viewed as "fighting words" that are outside the scope of
constitutional protection; the gesture did not, and had not in the

counsel stated in argument that the gesture used is commonly understood to mean
'fuck you.'" I at 1441 n.2. This gesture violated a school rule that authorized the
school to impose suspension for "'vulgar or extremely inappropriate language or
conduct directed to a staff member.'" Id. at 1441.
18 See id at 1441.
1
See id. at 1442. The court held that the "First Amendment protection of
freedom of expression" would be "made a casualty" if the school was allowed "to
force-feed good manners" to ruffians like Klein. I Hence, the court granted the
plaintiff a permanent injunction. See id.
See Klein, 635 F. Supp. at 1441. Noting the circumstances of the incident, the
court stressed that "[tihe conduct in question occurred in a restaurant parking lot,
far removed from any school premises or facilities at a time when teacher Clark was
not associated in any way with his duties as a teacher." Id.
1'

See id.

See id. at 1442. Various teachers testified that the incident with the plaintiff
student "sapped their resolve to enforce proper discipline upon him and other
students during school hours." Id. at 1442 n.4.
13 See id. The school officials argued that "this weakening of the resolve of the
teaching staff to enforce appropriate discipline ... constitutes a sufficient adverse
effect . . .upon the proper operation of the school and upon the teacher-pupil
relationship ... to deprive the gesture of its protected status." Id.
3
See id at 1442. Scoffing at the educator's argument, the court refused to "do
these sixty-two mature and responsible professionals the disservice of believing that
collectively their professional integrity, personal mental resolve, and individual
character are going to dissolve, willy-nilly, in the face of the digital posturing of this
splenetic, bad-mannered little boy." Id.at 1442 n.4.
132
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past, led to violence between students and teachers. 3 5
Recently, in one of the first cases of its kind, ajudge ruled that a
school could punish a student who posted a threatening web site,
even though the web site was created outside of school hours and
without the use of school equipment.3 6 In J S. v. Bethlehem Area School
District,' Justin Swidler was expelled after he created a web site that
threatened and degraded his math teacher, Kathleen Fulmer.""
Appealing the school district's punishment, the expelled eighth
grader sued the school district, alleging that the school district had
violated several of his constitutional rights, including his First
Amendment rights3
Judge Robert E. Simpson declared that the web site was not
protected expression pursuant to the First Amendment because the
site was materially disruptive to the school environment and because
it advocated violence against the school staff' 40 Quoting Fraser,the
court explained that the school appropriately imposed punishment
that would demonstrate to the students that speech such as Swidler's

See id. at 1441-42. Noting that educators are frequently the subjects of vulgar
gestures, the court concluded that "'the finger,' at least when used against a universe
of teachers, is not likely to provoke a violent response." Id at 1442 n.4.
1
SeeJ.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., No. 1998-CE-7696, at 17, 1 (Pa. D. & C.4th
filedJuly 23, 1999).
137
No. 1998-CE-7696 (Pa. D. & C.4th filedJuly 23, 1999).
138 See id. at 6, 2.
The web site, "Teacher Sux," contained offensive comments
about teachers and administrators. See id.at 1-2. Also, the site contained an image of
the teacher's decapitation and another of the teacher morphing into Hitler. See id.
at 2. The site also had a section stating, "'Why Should She Die - Take a look at the
diagram and the reasons I gave. then [sic] give me $20 to help pay for the hitman.'"
Id. After the site was discovered, Principal A. Thomas Kartsotis notified Bethlehem
Police; the United States Justice Department was ultimately notified by an unknown
individual, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation looked into the matter, but no
criminal charges were filed against Swidler. See Kathleen Parrish, Teacher Sues School
over Derogatory Web Site, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1.
Northhampton County District Attorney John Morganelli did not pursue criminal
charges, saying that the issue would be difficult to prosecute because the seriousness
of the threat was questionable. See id.
139 SeeJS. at 8.
In a separate matter, the subject of the web site, math teacher
Kathleen Fulmer, filed a lawsuit against the student and his parents, claiming that
the web site caused her to suffer public humiliation and mental and emotional
distress. See Parrish, supra note 138.
140 SeeJS. at 10. The court found that the web site had
a traumatic and disruptive
effect on the school environment because the staff feared for their safety and
disturbed students had to seek help from counselors. See id. at 5, 13. Finding for the
defendant school district, the court concluded that the "School District carried its
burden of demonstrating a reasonable basis for its conduct based on actual
disruption and a reasonable forecast of continued disruption" and that the
Constitution did not protect the "materially disruptive expression." Id. at 13.
1
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is incompatible with the basic values of public education.14 ' Although
Swidler emphasized that he utilized his home computer to create the
web site outside of school hours and that the speech was removed
from school property, 14 the court rejected this argument, stressing
that disruptive speech does not have to originate from the school
environment in order to be punished." Judge Simpson explained
that the site significantly interfered with the school's educational
mission although the site was created outside the school
environment.'" The court distinguished Beussink, noting that the
Woodland School District could not demonstrate any legitimate fear
of educational disruption, while the Bethlehem School District could
document actual disruption and could reasonably forecast continued
disruption.'4
Swidler also argued that the statements were not "true threats."1 "6
The court applied Lovelts objective test for ascertaining when
threatening speech loses constitutional protection and found that,
like the counselor in Love//, both the teacher and principal were
justified in taking the electronic threats seriously in light of the
violence prevalent in today's schools. 47 The court also compared the
web site to the censored speech in Bystrom and found the expression
in the former far more malignant.48 With the foregoing
considerations in mind, the judge concluded that Swidler's
See id. at 10 (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 685-86).
See id. at 1, 8.
14s See id. at 12. The court announced that "[t]he expression sanctioned as
141
1

disruptive need not originate in school." Id. The court observed that students who
make statements in an unofficial newspaper that is created, reproduced, and
disseminated off-campus could be disciplined as long as the "on-campus effect [of
the student expression] is materially disruptive." Id.
14 See id. at 13.
The court asserted that the web site hindered the school's
educational mission by disturbing the orderly functioning of the school and instilling
fear145into
of the teaching staff. See id.
See members
id.

at 14.

See Kathleen Parrish, Swidlers Lose the FirstRound;Judge Rules BASD Didn't Violate
Free Speech Right Wen it Expelled Boy over Web Site, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, July 24,
1999, at BI ("In their appeal of Justin's expulsion, the Swidlers argued that
statements Justin made against Fulmer did not represent a 'true threat under the
circumstances or under the law.'").
147 SeeJ.S. at 16-17. The court approvingly noted the school board's
finding that
the "Principal took the threat seriously and that [the] [t]eacher was frightened," and
that both "were justified in taking the threat seriously in light of the violence
prevalent in schools today." Id. at 17.
14 See id. at 15-16. Judge Simpson opined that Swidler's
expression was more
malignant because, unlike the plaintiffs in Bystrom, he actually "referenced [Fulmer]
and explained why she should die," sought money to finance the hiring of a hitman,
and included on the web site an image of Fulmer being shot in the head. Id. at 15.
14
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expression was not protected and that the school did not violate the
First Amendment in expelling him.'49
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR EDUCATORS WHO SEEK TO
PUNISH STUDENT THREATS

Judges and scholars seem uniformly to agree that threatening
student speech is incompatible with the educational mission of the
school and can be constitutionally punished. Yet no court seems
willing to state explicitly what should be obvious: that a student
threat need not rise to the level of a "true threat" before it legally can
be punished."' In analyzing this issue, courts universally cite Fraser
for the proposition that low-value student speech can be suppressed
for pedagogical reasons because the constitutional rights of pupils
are not as extensive as the rights of adults.'51 Hence, as with the
vulgarity in Fraser,threats that could not criminally be punished may
be censored when students utter them. At the same time, courts have
failed to present school administrators with a clear approach for
managing student threats within constitutional boundaries. The final
part of this Comment attempts to create a constitutional framework
that school officials can look to for guidance in responding to student
threats.'5
M4See id. at 17.
ISOTheJS. court came closest to acknowledging this fact when it declared that
[w]hether or not these expressions could be redressed outside the
public education context, and whether or not they were likely to incite
an immediate mutiny, the expressions were clearly of such a nature as
to invite the concerned attention of [the] School District and its
employees.
[W]e exercise deference to the judgment of those
entrusted with the daily activities of public education with respect to
their decision to discipline students for advocating violence against
teachers.
Id. at 16.
151 See, e.g., Bystrom, 686 F. Supp. at 1393; see alsojS. at 10. Professors Philip
T.K.
Daniel and Patrick D. Pauken reach a similar conclusion within the context of
electronic communications, finding that "while the government may not be able to
prosecute an individual for certain inappropriate speech [such as threats] he or she
sends to other individuals by electronic media, school officials might be able to
punish students for the same communication sent . . . over school computers."
Philip T.K. Daniel & Patrick D. Pauken, Educators' Authority & Students' First
Amendment Rights on the Way to Using the Information Highway: Cyberspace and Schoo4 54
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 109, 142 (1998).
1
State constitutional law also may affect a school's authority to control student
expression. The analysis proposed in Part IV is based upon the language and spirit
of the United States Constitution, but states may choose to give their citizens broader
First Amendment rights. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has
declared that high school students legally may utter vulgar speech within the school
environment as long as the vulgarity does not disrupt school activities. See Daniel &
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Modem communications technologies - the Internet and thess
World Wide Web - have complicated the student threat issue.
Although schools arguably should not treat Internet communications
as if they are fundamentally different from traditional
communication,'" these technologies alter constitutional analysis. 55

At least two scholars claim that no communications technology of the
twentieth century presents as much opportunity for uninhibited
expression as does the Internet.' The far-reaching influence of the
Internet is even more pronounced within the demographic of today's
students. 5 7 Students are intense users of the new medium, employing
the technology for both recreational and school-related purposes.158
The Internet, however, has also presented students with an
Pauken, supra note 151, at 147 (citing Pyle v. School Comm. of South Hadley, 667
N.E.2d 869 (Mass. 1996)).
153
See Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks:
The FirstAmendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1137, 1137 (1996). Internet
communications are fundamentally different from traditional mass communications
given the infinite number of information sources, the lack of a "gatekeeper"
(meaning that no individual or entity controls the distribution of information on the
Internet), and that users of the Internet are frequently also the creators of
information on the Internet. See id. at 1141-42.
i5 See Weng, supra note 22, at 832. According to Weng, if educators fail to
appreciate and understand the nature of Internet communications, but rather
choose to harshly and indiscriminately discipline electronic expression, they will
violate the Constitution. See id. Instead, Weng insists that schools should draft
definite policies regarding their students' use of the Internet and continue to follow
the mandate of the First Amendment when deciding whether electronic
communication should be punished. See id.
1
See Greenberg, supra note 49, at 694 ("Some say that the same principles that
governed free speech in the past should govern these new technologies. Others
argue that this technology is so revolutionary that it calls for fundamental changes to
the standard framework of First Amendment analysis.").
1
See Sanford & Lorenger, supranote 153, at 1137 ("No technological advance
in
communications during the 20th century offers as much opportunity for robust,
uninhibited self-expression as the freewheeling Internet.").
157 See Michael Wolff, Why Your Kids Know More About the Future
Than You Do, NEW
YORK, MAY 17, 1999, at 30. Wolff explains that "[a]s Internet media becomes
pervasive media - pervasive like rock and roll - it will no doubt precipitate a shift
in teen personality, behavior, [and] aspirations." Id. Moreover, Wolff analogizes the
thrill for today's teenagers of 'cybering' or 'surfing' the Internet to the sexual
experimentation and freedom of the 1970s. See id Another scholar describes the
younger generation as Internet-savvy individuals who are distrustful of government
and committed to individual economic and personal freedom, as symbolized by the
freedom of the Internet. See Pavela, supra note 22, at 166 (citing John Katz, Netizen:
Birth of a DigitalNation, WIRED, Apr. 1997, at 49).
158
See Weng, supra note 22, at 765-66. Weng describes how students use the
Internet to socialize, conduct research, gather news, shop, and play games. See id.
Teachers at many post-secondary schools, including law schools, are using the
Internet to distribute information concerning classes and assignments and are also
utilizing the Internet to communicate with and instruct students. See id at 763-64.
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unprecedented opportunity to candidly ridicule their schools and
teachers."s
Therefore, the prevalent use of this technology by
students, along with the unique characteristics of this new medium,
are considerations that must be addressed in creating a constitutional
framework for school administrators to follow.
My solution for school officials who seek to punish threatening
student speech, but fear constitutional repercussions, involves a factspecific analysis that focuses on three factors.'60 First, guided by the
rationale of cases such as Klein v. Smith and jS. v. Bethlehem Area School
District, the officials should examine how, when, and within what
circumstances the threat was made. Second, the school should study
the language of the threat itself to ascertain how a reasonable person
would perceive the specific utterance. Finally, the school should
assess whether the speech did, or will, disrupt the educational
environment.
Pursuant to the first factor, if the student uttered the threat as
part of a school-sponsored forum, for example, during an assembly or
within a student publication, the school should have the authority to
reasonably punish, and thereby disassociate itself from, the student
speech. If the speech occurred within the school environment but
does not bear the imprimatur of the school, then school officials
should assess whether the school indirectly sponsored the speech.
For example, if the threat was sent electronically, either via e-mail or
posted on a web site, the school officials should discover whether the
student utilized school equipment to send or create the threatening
message. According to the Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier, if a school is somehow subsidizing the student speech,
then school officials can control the content of the speech.16' Thus, if
the student is using school resources, such as school computers or
school-provided Internet access, to create the speech, the officials
See Terry McManus, Internet Raises New Rights Issuesfor Students, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr.
21, 1998, at 1 ("Underground newspapers have long been part of the scholastic
experience, from grade school on up, but the Web has given students an
unprecedented ability to openly ridicule their schools and even individual
teachers.").
160 These three factors are a distillation from
the federal and state court opinions
previously discussed. Several scholarly publications, however, also have identified
these factors. For example, Professors Daniel and Pauken state that a school's
constitutional authority to limit student speech rights will likely depend on the type
of expression, whether the expression is school sponsored, and whether the
expression has a negative or disruptive impact on the school environment or the
rights of other students. See Daniel & Pauken, supra note 151, at 154-55.
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72; see also supra notes 89-94 and accompanying
text (analyzing Hazelwood).
159
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have a right to control the expression that is produced.'6
For the second inquiry, the officials should objectively evaluate
the language of the threat and employ the Lovel "reasonable person"
test. Although this test may be viewed as a "true threat" test, the
Lovel court utilized the test within the context of a student threat therefore, it is appropriate for use within this analysis. School
officials should determine whether a reasonable person in the
student's position would anticipate that the teacher, school
administrator, or fellow student would interpret his statement as an
earnest expression of an intent to commit violence.1 6 In reaching
this conclusion, school officials should observe the exact language of
the threat, the medium by which the student communicated it, and
the circumstances surrounding the making of the threat. This
analysis is especially important because a court's characterization of
the student expression is frequently pivotal to its ultimate conclusion
as to whether the speech can be censored.'"
An example of some of the aforementioned issues involved a
middle school teacher who received an anonymous e-mail message 6 5
from a student telling the teacher to "make Friday's test easy or
else."'6 6 When the teacher received the message, he had no way of
knowing the identity or true intentions of the sender. 67 The sender
could have been a student with a history of discipline for violent
behavior, or the sender might have been a student who was known
for harmless pranks.' 6 This inability to evaluate the seriousness of
the threat led the teacher to err on the side of safety and treat the

162 See Weng, supra note 22, at 815 ("[A] school
could attempt to place almost any
manner of restriction on student Internet expressions made through school accounts
by claiming furtherance of its mission to uphold its good name, credibility, and
reputation .... ").
63 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (describing Lovell's
objective test).
164 Compare Buessink, 30 F. Supp.2d at 1182 (holding
that the school could not
punish the student's "provocative and challenging speech"), with JS. at 10 ("We
conclude that the expression was not constitutionally protected because it . . .
advocated violence against school staff.").
16
A student can easily ensure that the message he sends is anonymous by
utilizing an "anonymous remailer" service. See Greenberg, supra note 49, at 678-79.
"Anonymous remailers are relay stations on the Internet that cloak the identity of
every user who sends a message through them." Id. at 678. These services have been
criticized because they allow users to make threats without fear of being identified.
See id. at 679.
1
Interview with C.J. DeSantis, Former Teacher at Manasquan High School, in
Manasquan, N.J. (Aug. 14, 1999).

167

See id

16

See id.
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threat cautiously.' 69 A court would likely find that any reasonable
teacher would be frightened by these anonymous e-mail messages
and that the student who sent the e-mails could be punished. 70 As
the court did in Love// school officials should highlight the violent
tendencies of today's youth in order to demonstrate the
reasonableness of a teacher's fears.'
Ultimately, if school officials
answer this second inquiry in the affirmative and decide that a
reasonable person would have been frightened by the menacing
speech, the school could constitutionally punish the student for his
threats.
If the answer to the second question is "no," or even an
uncertain "yes," however, the school must utilize the Tinker test to
make a final evaluation of the effect the threat had on the learning
environment."7
Courts universally disfavor speech that interferes
with the school's educational goals, goals that include helping
students acquire knowledge and ensuring that students learn

tolerance, civility, and interpersonal skills.'7 As Judge Simpson stated
in J.S., school officials do not have to wait for potential harm to come
to fruition before they can take precautionary measures; school
officials only have to demonstrate a substantial basis for concluding
that the speech would result in harm to students.'74 As with the
creation of the web site in JS. or the dissemination of the
169 See id. The teacher contacted school administrators
and police and asked
America Online to divulge the identity of the student. See id.
170 In this case, the student was given a verbal warning but was not otherwise

punished. See id.
7
See Lovell 90 F.3d at 374 (recognizing the violence that is prevalent in today's
public schools). Schools can also point to studies that indicate that minors are being
conditioned to enjoy violence. SeeJo Myers, A World Awash with Violence, THE EVENING
STANDARD (Palmerston North, New Zealand), Aug. 28, 1999, at 7. Dave Grossman, a
former military psychologist and professor of psychology at West Point, declares that
today's society is teaching children how to kill and to enjoy the act of killing. See id.
According to Grossman, today's video and computer games are virtually murder
simulators, so effective that the Army has adapted various games for its own combat
training. See id. Grossman concludes that some children are actually better at killing
than are law enforcement professionals because of the violence and physiological
arousal inherent in the games that children are conditioned to enjoy at a very young
age. See id. Another study indicates that the rate at which teenage boys killed
increased 300% between 1980 and 1995, with many of the homicides occurring on or
near school property. See News Conference (statement of Troy Eid, chief counsel to
Colorado governor Bill Owens), supra note 2.
n See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing Tinker).
:73 See Weng, supra note 22, at 777-78 (describing the
goals of public education).
1
SeeJS. at 11-12 ("It is clear the school authorities need not wait for a potential
harm to occur before taking protective action .... Nor must the school district be
able to predict with certainty that a certain number of students in all grades would be
harmed.") (citations omitted).
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underground newspapers in Bystrom, a student's expression can be
punished even if the expression did not directly cause a material
disruption to the school environment. Such student expression is
punishable as long as it was foreseeable that the school environment
would be disturbed by the controversy that resulted from other
students reading and discussing the controversial expression during
classes. 7 5 Yet, pursuant to Tinker, schools must have a reasonable
basis for concluding that the student speech is likely to, and not
merely has the potential to, substantially disrupt the learning
environment.' 76
Once again, the characteristics of electronic communication
may complicate the analysis under the third factor. Author Sally
Greenberg suggests that the standards courts utilize for determining
whether expression is a "true threat" focus on whether the
communication is directed toward an identifiable person or group of
persons frightened as a result of the threats.'7 7 Web sites, however,
are not sent to anyone in particular; they merely exist for anyone who
chooses to access them. Therefore, a student web site that mentions
vandalizing a teacher's home but does not identify a specific teacher
is not likely to be deemed a "true threat." School officials, however,
may find that the author of the web site causes material disruption to
school activities because other pupils visit or discuss the web site
during classes, or because the web site incites students to commit
vandalism.
When school officials can document a substantial disruption in
the educational environment, they should be able to punish the
student speech that caused this disruption without fearing that they
will violate the First Amendment.7 Courts must consider and respect
that educators simply wish to perform their jobs as effectively as
possible and have a strong desire to avoid litigation and the
uncertainties of the courtroom)s7 Nonetheless, schools officials must
SeeJ.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., No. 1998-CE-7696, (Pa. C. filed July
23,
1999); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987).
176 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 737 ("[In our system, undifferentiated
fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression.").
See Greenberg, supra note 49, at 680.
178 Before school administrators implement punishment,
however, they must
provide a student with notice and some type of hearing, otherwise the school
administrators will violate the student's due process fights. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 574, 581 (1975) (holding that students' interest in education is a property
interest that cannot be taken away without providing minimum procedures, namely,
notice and an opportunity for a hearing).
179See News Conference (statement of ChiefJudge Wilkinson, United States Court of
175
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remember that they do not have unlimited discretion to censor
nonthreatening speech simply because they disagree with the
underlying message or because the speech casts the school in an
unfavorable light."' When high school student Sean O'Brien created
a web site that described his band teacher as "an overweight middleaged man who doesn't like to get haircuts," he was suspended for
eight days and threatened with expulsion.'8' O'Brien and his parents
filed suit against the school for $500,000, alleging that his First
Amendment rights had been violated.'82 In a sensible move, the
school district settled the case out-of-court, paying O'Brien $30,000
and apologizing for censoring his speech.'83 It should have been clear
to administrators that, even in these violent times, no reasonable
educator could have viewed O'Brien's web site as threatening. The
school could not rely upon Fraserto argue that these comments were
vulgar or profane, nor could the school rely upon Tinker to claim that
the web site was substantially disruptive to the school environment.
CONCLUSION

Punishment of pure speech may be a necessary evil within the
educational setting.' Many scholars and educators, however, argue
Appeals, Fourth Circuit), supra note 2. ChiefJudge Wilkinson stated:
So we're now in a society which freely and instinctively litigates routine
public school decisions in the federal judiciary .... [L]itigation is not
what school teachers and principals and school board members do or
desire to do for a living. Why did they go into education? Not to
litigate. They went into education because they wished to devote their
lives as professional educators to improving the minds and broadening
the horizons of their students. They did not plan to spend their time
fending off these same students, either in the hallway or in court.
Time spent in court is time out of the classroom.
Answering
depositions educates no one. A teacher or principal probably wants to
be in court about as much as you or I want to be in the hospital. They
would do anything to avoid it ....
Id.
ISOSee Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 837
(1995) (holding that the University of Virginia's denial of school funding to a
student publication based on the religious nature of the publication violated the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech).
181 McManus, supra note 159.
182 See id.
193 See id.
1
Boston College Professor William Kilpatrick, who teaches and writes on
adolescent psychology, concludes that 70% of character formation is the formation
of good behavior habits. See News Confeince (statement of William Kilpatrick, author
and professor), supra note 2. Kilpatrick believes that formation of these behavioral
habits requires that parents and educators discipline students and provide consistent
standards of conduct for them. See id. Another expert expresses the view that
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that punishments such as suspension or expulsion address the
obvious manifestations of a student's problems, but fail to address the
underlying difficulties that cause students to utilize threatening
8
speech.
Other experts claim that singling out and punishing
eccentric students will only further alienate and enrage these
students.' 5 Even more alarming is that students who are punished
and removed from the school can still find a way to inflict harm. 7
Punishment acts as more than a remedy or deterrent, however,
because it ensures that educators, school psychologists, and parents
are informed that a particular student has a social or behavioral
problem.
As students advance in grade level or change schools, a
record of prior punishment may forewarn school administrators who
might otherwise not regard a student's threats as serious.
Furthermore, parents who are negatively affected by their child's
punishment, because they either have to pay a fine or civil damages
or stay home with a suspended child, will be motivated to prevent a
recurrence of the offending behavior.'
students need "moderate, progressive discipline, coupled with dialogue designed to
promote self-realization." Pavela, supra note 22, at 164. Pavela also notes that a
single-minded reliance upon punishment will not effectively combat incivility and
cruelty, but rather, the offending students may be converted into First Amendment
martyrs. See id. at 166.
185 See News Conference (statement of Ann Beeson, attorney with the ACLU), supra
note 2 (claiming that, according to the National Association of School Psychologists,
an expulsion does not change a student's behavior; rather, the best solution is to
instruct these students how to think, act, and deal with their anger).
86
SeeJames Alan Fox &Jack Levin, The Hard (But Doable)Job of Making Schools Safe,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 22, 1999, at Fl. Fox, the Lipman Family Professor of
Criminal Justice at Northeastern University, and Levin, the Brudnick Professor of
Sociology and Criminology at Northeastern University, argue against strict
punishment and disciplinary measures because such tactics may further alienate atrisk teenagers. See id.
187 See Simpson, supra note 5.
Simpson noted that alleged killer Kip Kinkel was
suspended the day before he began firing shots into his school's cafeteria. See id.
Many experts even suggest implementing anonymous tip lines and
encouraging students to trust their teachers enough to utilize the tip lines and to
warn officials about problematic peers before violence occurs. See Students Hold Key,
supra note 17. One problem confronting school administrators is that many parents
refuse to believe that their child has a behavioral problem or poses a danger to
himself or others. See Francis X. Clines, Computer Project Seeks to Avert Youth Violence,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1999, at 20. New computer software programs are currently
being designed to assist administrators in identifying these potentially dangerous
students and to provide doubting parents with documentation of their child's
problems.
See id.; see also infra notes 191-194 (discussing new technological
approaches to confronting student threats).
See News Conference (statement of William Kilpatrick, author and professor),
supra note 2 ("Over the last 30 years, various court decisions and legislative acts have
had the effect of inhibiting both school and parental discipline" and "many
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Other scholars suggest that school administrators can prevent
threatening student speech and the violence that may accompany it
by making the school more of a community. Such scholars advocate
decreasing class and school size, increasing educational and
psychological staffs, and implementing longer school hours.', Some
even advocate combating violence by using the very technology that
today's students find so familiar. New software, created by researcher
Alice Ray, is teaching students how to handle grief, prevent violence,
cope with teasing, and respond to student threats.'9 ' Ray hopes that
schools will use the software to take a preventive approach to student
violence. 92 Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, in conjunction with a company specializing in threat
evaluation, is developing a national pilot program for December
1999, known as Mosaic-2000, that utilizes computer data to identify
students who pose a significant risk of committing violent acts.'9 3 The
program involves twenty schools across the country that will use the
software to help identify potentially violent students, as well as
students who are prone to commit violent acts because they feel
victimized by their school or by their peers.'9
Ultimately, though, the decision of how most effectively to
prevent and punish student misconduct must remain within the
discretion of educators. As Chief Judge Wilkinson of the Fourth
Circuit noted, more federal lawsuits will not improve the
environment within today's schools."l According to Chief Judge
Wilkinson, a better solution is to free educators from the burdens of

parents... simply hope that the schools will take care of disciplining their children,
but as I've suggested, the schools don't want to get involved.").
190 See Fox & Levin, supra
note 186.
191 See Could Software Prevent the Next School Shooting?,
PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 27, 1999.

Ray developed a "multimedia database of social topics and life skill training with a
hip look and feel." Id. The database is the result of years of research that led Ray to
conclude that "all people who hurt people lacked at least one of seven key socialemotional skills." Id. The "School Safety Needs Assessment Tool" is available free on
the Internet at <http://www.rippleeffects.com/relateforteens/>. See id.
'92 See id.
193 See Clines, supra note 188.
The Mosaic programs "use carefully worded
questions about student behavior based on case histories of people who have turned
violent" and helps "officials discern a real threat amid the innocuous, if frightening,
outbursts that regularly cause concern." Id.
194 See id. The ACLU dismissed the program as a "technological
Band-Aid," while
the developer of the program claims that the system provides organization of and
expert opinion concerning information about students that principals already
possess. See id.

195 See News Conference (statement of ChiefJudge Wilkinson,
United States Court of
Appeals, Fourth Circuit), supranote 2.
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litigation and provide them with a greater role in the administration
of their schools.'9
The Bystrom court recognized that First Amendment cases pose
difficult questions with high-stakes outcomes. 97 The court noted that
the preservation of constitutional freedoms depends upon
courageous citizens who have the conviction to challenge those who
would encroach upon those freedoms. 9 8 At the same time, the court
recognized that citizens who would rely on the Constitution for
protection of frivolous or malicious conduct threaten the dilution of
a
The court explained that
those very constitutional freedoms."
2
definite line does not conveniently divide these two circumstances. W
As courts attempt to draw this line in the context of student
threats, they must remember that adolescents are still learning
responsibility, civility, and maturity, and consequently need to grow
into their constitutional rights. Courts must recognize that students
like Columbine killer Eric Harris, who declared on his web site, "I am
the law. If you don't like it, you die,"20 ' fail to realize that they must
respect the rights of others before they can enjoy those same rights. 2
Instead of just focusing on the value of individual freedom, as courts
seem inherently to do, schools can and must provide the socially
valuable service of encouraging and developing society's shared
values. Courts would do well to follow the lead of Judges Wilkinson
and Simpson in acknowledging that educational professionals must

1
9

'98
'9
2W

See id.

See Bystrom, 686 F. Supp. at 1395-96.

See id. at 1395.
See id. at 1395-96.
See id. at 1396.

See News Conference (statement of Troy Eid, chief counsel to Colorado governor
Bill Owens), supranote 2.
See News Conference (statement of ChiefJudge Wilkinson, United States Court of
Appeals, Fourth Circuit), supra note 2. ChiefJudge Wilkinson stated:
201

Rights are a precious thing in America .

.

.

. But the rights of

adolescents are not in all respects the same as the rights of adults, and
it is sensible to insist that students grow gradually into their exercise...
. Responsibility involves a respect for rights also, not only for one's own
rights but for the rights of others. Responsibilities go hand in hand
with rights, and the former must be learned before the latter can ever
be enjoyed.
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be granted ample discretion in order to regulate and punish student
threats and keep America's schools productive and safe."5

Lisa M. Pisciotta

See id. ChiefJudge Wilkinson declared that
&0
the causes and cures of the problems of school violence . . . are not
simple. I...
believe, however, that school order will be improved in
this country with fewer federal lawsuits, and that one small part of the
solution lies in backing up school authorities and in giving principals,
teachers, parents and communities themselves a greater freedom from
federal litigation and hence a greater hand in governance of their own
schools.
I; see also Fischer, supra note 70, at 292 (arguing that the entry of the law into the
education process has not improved education and that society must ensure that the
law does not destroy "the elusive process of education and the unique environment
of the academy which has been a mainstay of our democratic system").

